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How does Paul Ricœur apply metapsychology to collective memory? 
Esteban Lythgoe 
Abstract:  
The concept of “abused collective memory” gathers two of Ricœur’s main lines of concern: history and 
psychoanalysis. The article aims to explain how this convergence was possible, especially, when the 
transposition of the Freudian metapsychology from the individual to the collective level was hindered by 
the Ricœurian emphasis on the Freudian libidinal economy. Our hypothesis is that this convergence 
required two intermediate steps. The first one gathered psychoanalysis and history within the larger 
framework of otherness as flesh. The second step was a transcendental turn, which would lead Ricœur to 
inquire about the structures of collective existence that make it possible to apply psychoanalytic categories 
at that level, rather than considering how this transposition can be done. By taking this turn Ricœur found 
that a phenomenology of the capable human being was the condition of possibility of a temporal ontology, 
and then, could describe this ontology as the condition of possibility of his phenomenology. 
Keywords: twofold expressivity, libidinal economy, flesh, capable human being, temporal ontology 
Résumé:  
Le concept de «mémoire collective abusée» réunit deux des principales préoccupations de Ricœur: l'histoire 
et la psychanalyse. L'article vise à expliquer comment cette convergence a été possible, alors que la 
transposition de la métapsychologie freudienne de l'individu au niveau collectif était au départ entravée par 
l'emphase de Ricœur sur l'économie libidinale freudienne. Notre hypothèse est que cette convergence 
nécessite deux étapes intermédiaires. La première étape rassemble la psychanalyse et l'histoire dans les 
grands genres de l'altérité, en tant que chair. La seconde étape correspond à un tournant transcendantal qui  
conduit Ricœur à s’interroger sur les structures de l'existence collective qui rendent possible l'application 
des catégories psychanalytiques à ce niveau plutôt que sur la faisabilité d’une telle transposition. En prenant 
un tel tournant, Ricœur découvre qu’une phénoménologie de l’homme capable est la condition de 
possibilité d’une ontologie temporelle  et il décrit ensuite cette ontologie comme la condition de possibilité 
de sa phénoménologie.  
Mots-clés: Double expressivité, économie libidinale, chair, homme capable, ontologie temporelle 
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 Psychoanalysis for a traumatized collective memory? 
In his essay on Freud, Ricœur used the phrase “twofold expressivity” to refer to the 
dialectic of knowledge and desire in representation, which he explained as follows: “[…] 
representation obeys not only a law of intentionality, which makes it the expression of some 
object, but also another law, which makes it the manifestation of life, of an effort or desire. It is 
because of the interference of the latter expressive function that representation can be distorted.”1 
According to Jean-Luc Amalric, Ricœur’s original contribution in this work was to gather the 
theory of expression and the twofold expressivity within the framework of an interpretation of 
human psychism.2  
Thirty years later, in the 1990s, there took place in the philosophy of history what was 
known as the “Memory Turn.” Studying the testimonies of survivors of traumatic events, 
especially the Holocaust, historians began to pay more attention to the effects of these events on 
the survivors’ communities and their memories rather than describing the past “the way it 
happened.” As a contribution to this way of considering history, Ricœur applied some of the 
conclusions of his various works on Freud to this kind of traumatized collective memory. After 
analyzing historical representation as an expression of the past, mainly in Time and Narrative and 
“The Mark of the Past,” in Memory, History, Forgetting, he began to consider memory as a 
collective capability and mnemonic representation as a manifestation of collective identity. 
Ricœur studied how traumatic events can affect the development of this capability and this 
identity and proposed that history could solve all the related problems, by applying Freud’s 
Metapsychology to the community. Ricœur’s idea is to employ metapsychological categories 
directly to the collective. That means that its application is neither analogical nor metaphorical.3 
The aim of this paper is to establish how Ricœur extended metapsychology to the collective 
sphere.4 Our analysis is in two parts. In the first part, we will begin by sketching the guidelines 
for Ricœur’s interpretation of Freud’s theory. Then, we will show that the Instinct Theory, one of 
the most important contributions of Freudian psychoanalysis, according to Ricœur, is an obstacle 
to transpose psychoanalytical categories into equivalents in the collective sphere. In Ricœur’s 
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opinion, Freud’s Papers on Metapsychology were the most successful in terms of fusing the 
economy of instincts and language in the so-called “first topography” (unconscious, preconscious 
and conscious). Although Freud had already abandoned the use of biological language at that 
stage, Ricœur still thought that since this topography retained a connection with the economy of 
instincts it was still associated with the individual. That meant that metapsychology was 
thematized within an isolated psychism, which did not take account of intersubjective relations, 
and so could not be used to give an account of collective behaviours. In the second part of the 
paper, we will explain how Ricœur managed to overcome that obstacle. We will argue that he did 
so in two steps. The first one was taken in the context of “a dialogue” between Ricœur and Freud, 
which was constructed in the mid-1990s and placed psychoanalysis and history under the same 
figure of the meta-category of the other: the flesh. The second step was Ricœur’s decision to take 
a transcendental turn and try to identify the structures of collective existence that make possible 
the implementation of the psycho—analytical categories instead of raising the traditional 
questions about how to transpose those categories. This transcendental turn involved two 
different operations: the reduction of psychoanalysis to the phenomenology of the capable 
human being and, then, the reduction of this anthropology to a temporal ontology. Although the 
temporal ontology is based on Heidegger’s existential analytic, that last reduction would not 
have been possible had Ricœur not changed his approach to Heideggerian temporality after Time 
and Narrative III. According to our hypothesis, it was this change in his approach to Heideggerian 
temporality that allowed Ricœur to homogenize the individual and the collective, thus rendering 
psychoanalysis compatible with Ricœurian hermeneutics and, consequently, permitting the 
transposition of analytic categories to history.5 
Instinctual energy as the limit of collective analysis: 
A traditional topic of debate in the reception of Freudian psychoanalysis concerns the 
object of its application. Does it apply only to individuals or to collectives as well? Neither 
Ricœur nor other authors, such as Habermas, who worked on psychoanalysis from the 
perspective of hermeneutics,6 could evade this discussion. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ricœur 
thought that psychoanalysis should be applied only to individuals. Thus, in his essay on Freud he 
explained “moreover, in the Freudian topography that debate is projected onto a representation 
of the psychical apparatus in which only the ‘vicissitudes of the instincts,’ within an isolated 
psychism, are thematized. Stated bluntly, the Freudian systematization is solipsistic, whereas the 
situations and relations analysis speaks of and which speak in the analysis are intersubjective.”7 
The reason for this solipsism lies in the concept of instinct, which Freud describes from a near-
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biological point of view as follows: “an ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept frontier between the 
mental and the somatic, as a psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the 
organism and reaching the mind…”8 
As Ricœur understood Freud’s development, he did not think that the Austrian 
psychologist had translated the individual psychological categories into the sociology of culture. 
Instead, he described that development in terms of a growing complexity in the analysis of the 
individual psyche, ranging from the first topography, which does not take intersubjectivity into 
account, to the second where others play a prominent role. This way of characterizing Freud’s 
development leads Ricœur to the conclusion that “the object of psychoanalysis is not human 
desire as such— by which we mean wishes, libido, instinct, and eros (all these words having a 
specific signification in their specific contexts)—but human desire understood in a more or less 
conflictual relation with culture […]: for these historical and systematic reasons, psychoanalysis is 
the theory of the dialectic between desire and culture.”9 
Ricœur highlighted Freud’s recognition of both linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of 
the human condition. Jacques Sedat recognizes Ricœur’s interest in an “instinctual experience 
capable of being told,” yet he states that “[…] there is no instinctual experience susceptible of 
being said. The only thing that can be said is a representative experience. There is no pure instinct 
that can be said. The only thing that can be said arises from an activity of representation.”10 We 
do not think that this criticism should be attributed to Ricœur, who besides distinguishing 
instinct from representation, stated that they are both articulated by the productive imagination in a 
synthetic operation that functions in a way similar to the Kantian schematism.11 In a paper 
written at the end of 1970s, Ricœur described the role of imagination as follows: “My own 
working hypothesis is that the universe of discourse appropriate for psychoanalytic discovery is 
not so much a linguistic one as one of fantasy in general. […] I shall suggest in concluding, 
however, that a theory of fantasy is perhaps more likely to account for the articulation of both the 
semiotic and the drive than is a linguistic theory.”12 In fact, Ricœur rejected those post-Freudian 
trends, which reduced psychic problems to an economy of instincts. In this regard he agreed with 
“[…] [Lacan´s] general attempt to break with the biologism and behaviorism attributed to post-
Freudian psychoanalysis and to ‘return to Freud’ by situating not only the analytic situation but 
also the operations of the unconscious operations, which the theory attempts to account for 
systematically, within the unique ‘field of speech and language’.”13 However, he rejected Lacan’s 
view that identifying the symbolic with language was a way of overcoming the limitations of 
economic explanation. In his opinion, reducing all psychic structures to language14 simply 
doubles the economy of instincts at the level of linguistic explanation: “the linguistic 
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interpretation does not constitute an alternative to the economic explanation; it simply prevents 
the latter from being reified by showing that the mechanisms that come under economics are 
accessible only in their relationship to hermeneutics. To say that repression is ‘metaphor’ is not to 
replace the economic hypothesis but rather to parallel it with a linguistic interpretation, and thus 
relate it to the universe of meaning without reducing it to that universe.”15 Nonetheless, during 
the 1970s and 1980s Ricœur turned from a hermeneutics of the symbol to a hermeneutics of the 
text and narration,16 and his investigations began to highlight narrative topics instead of issues of 
instincts. In papers published during that period of time, we can find some attempts to apply a 
rather narrativist approach to psychological pathologies.17 The application of analytic categories 
to non-individual subjects became easier to accomplish thanks to this kind of development.  
One of the goals of Memory, History, Forgetting was the application of psychoanalytic 
categories to collective memory, but one of the conditions for its success was to dissociate the 
traditional identification between memory and the individual. Ricœur appealed to two different 
argumentative strategies in order to achieve this target, the first one was connected to memory 
and the second one to forgetting. The first one was a psychic development of Strawson’s 
argument on multiple attribution. In Individuals, the mobility of attributions from oneself to 
someone other than oneself implies three different conditions: 1. the attribution can be suspended 
or performed; 2. these predicates retain the same sense in two different situations of attribution; 3. 
this multiple attribution maintains the dissymmetry between self-ascribable and other-
ascribable.18 According to Ricœur, memory fulfills these three conditions. The phenomenology of 
memory is developed in Memory, History, Forgetting in such a way that attribution is suspended, 
thus satisfying the first condition: It begins by asking about what is remembered, then, how 
memory works, and only at the end it is asked who remembers. The fulfillment of the first 
condition makes possible the second one, because after suspending the attribution, it is possible 
to attribute memory to different subjects without modifying its meaning. Finally, the fact that 
another different from me is unable to confirm memories in the same way that I do, confirms the 
third condition, that is, the dissymmetry of ascription. 
The second strategy to dissociate the attribution of memory from individual subjects is 
developed in the section devoted to forgetting. Ricœur accepts the Bergsonian dissociation of the 
representational memory from the neuronal trace. For both, Ricœur and Bergson, the brain has no 
function in memory. Since the question about where memories are stored becomes meaningless, 
so too does the association between mnemonic traces and individuals. The main question about 
memory becomes how recognition is possible.19  
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After dissociating memory from the individual, Ricœur proposes a hermeneutic concept 
of memory: “But to speak of memory is not only to evoke a psychophysiological faculty which 
has something to do with the preservation and recollection of traces of the past; it is to put 
forward the ‘narrative’ function through which this primary capacity of preservation and 
recollection is exercised at the public level of language.”20 As this reduced definition of memory is 
shared by both the individual and the collective it excludes particularities that traditionally 
characterized individual and collective memory. 
Despite the above mentioned changes, Ricœur’s phenomenology of forgetting prevents 
the proposed direct translation. Forgetting is first explained in Bergsonian terms as a passage 
from consciousness to unconsciousness. Unlike Freud, Bergson defined consciousness as the 
willingness to act and care for life, whereas the unconscious no longer acts directly on our lives as 
it is outside of our everyday concerns and is powerless. Since this explanation does not provide a 
strategy to account for the passage from forgetting to memory, Ricœur appeals to Freud's concept 
of the unconscious and with this to the instinctual drives.21 This addition explains memory 
diseases, linked to forgetting and repetition, as well as the possibility of overcoming them. 
However, as already explained, instinctual energy despite having lost the biological connotations 
is still tied to the individual preventing, consequently, the direct translation of metapsychological 
categories at the collective level. 
Transcendental reduction as the way for a psychoanalytical history: 
The transposition of analytical categories to the collective level usually proceeds by 
analogy. In fact, Barash criticizes Ricœur’s interpretation by underlining the negative 
consequences of employing such analogies between the individual and collective levels. 
According to Barash, the particularities of collective identity are lost in this process of 
translation,22 affecting the use of categories like ‘debt’, ‘duty of memory’ and even ‘work of 
memory’. As we explained at the beginning of this paper, Ricœur’s strategy is still more drastic 
than Barash’s assertion, since he endeavours to achieve a direct transposition. However, the 
inclusion of the economy of instincts to explain mnemonic pathologies hinders this kind of 
translation. Our hypothesis is that in order to overcome this obstacle Ricœur performs a twostep 
transposition. The first one, developed before Memory, History, Forgetting, is to establish a common 
framework between psychoanalysis and history. The second one engages a reductive strategy that takes 
psychoanalysis back to a more fundamental level,23 similar to the strategy of the phenomenology of memory 
just explained.  
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Over the years Ricœur modified his interpretation of Freud and, as Busacchi has 
remarked, this tendency continued after Oneself as Another.24 One of the conditions highlighted by 
historians for applying the psychoanalytic categories to society is to find a common framework 
for history and psychoanalysis. This search for a common framework can be seen in the article 
“Uncanniness Many Times Over,” which was published in 1994. In order to understand how this 
framework was developed, we must go back to the Tenth Study of Oneself as Another, where 
Ricœur distinguished three types of passive experiences affecting the self-experience: the other as 
flesh, referred to the internal principle of action that we suffer but cannot master; otherness, 
indicating what is different from us and affects us; and finally, otherness as consciousness, 
enjoining us from the moral plane both within and above us.25 Of these three figures, 
psychoanalysis was associated in Oneself as Another with the third one, due to the role of the 
superego, developed in “The Ego and the Id.”26 Moreover, in this book Ricœur does not associate 
the past with any of these figures. On the basis of Time and Narrative, however, we may say that it 
is in this period that Ricœur considered the past to be the other as otherness. Indeed, historical 
representation, as standing-for, is based on the trace and the trace as it “[…] is left by the past”27 is 
something strange for us. Briefly, in this book, history and psychoanalysis did not share a 
common framework.  
In “Uncanniness Many Times Over,” Ricœur returns to his analysis of the experience of 
the other. Although the triple experience of passivity remains the same, the figure of the flesh 
becomes more important than the other two. The Husserlian category of the flesh became the 
articulation point of oneself with the alter-ego. As Richard Kearney explains, the flesh “…is the 
pole of reference of all bodies belonging to this immanent nature of ownness. And it is by pairing 
one flesh with another that we derive the notion of an alter-ego. But here we return to the deeper 
paradox: flesh as a paradigm of otherness. Flesh is what is both most mine and most other. Closest 
to me and furthest from me at the same time.”28 Framing psychoanalysis and history under the 
metacategory of the flesh he modifies the way of conceiving both of them. Busacchi draws our 
attention to a modification in the treatment of psychoanalysis.29 Instead of working on the 
superego Ricœur studies drives and compulsion, as they were analyzed in “The Uncanny” and 
“Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through.”30 Ricœur explains that Freudian uncanniness is 
caused by the feeling aroused by operations of the unconscious, which is at the same time close 
and strange. The second of these Freudian papers is associated with the first, and it aims to 
provide a psychoanalytic explanation of our inability to talk about trauma and indicates both 
how trauma operates and how it can be overcome.  
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In “Uncanniness Many Times Over,” Ricœur not only reconsiders the category of the 
other associated with psychoanalysis he also reconsiders the one associated with the past. If the 
past is other, it is other no longer in terms of otherness but as flesh. This change is possible 
because Ricœur replaces the analysis of the past as history with that of the past as memory. Thus, 
following the reference to “Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through,” Ricœur finds in the 
double feeling of the familiarity and strangeness of personal memory the meta-category of flesh. 
Afterwards Ricœur shifts his focus from the individual memory to the historical one, addressing 
the issue of the Holocaust survivors with the following words: “The paradox [of familiarity and 
strangeness] is at its peak in the case of the memory of the Shoah in its confrontation with the will 
not to forget, hence with the duty to recount and recount again, and with the feeling expressed by 
so many of its survivors of a finally incommunicable and, in this sense, unnarratable character of 
their memoirs…”31 Thus, thanks to the movement in psychoanalysis from superego to drives and 
from history to memory, both disciplines fall within the metacategory of the other as flesh. The 
uncanny (Unheimlichkeit) as feeling still remains present in Memory, History, Forgetting, but in this 
case it justifies, from the historian’s perspective, the impossibility of reducing memory to a story 
or vice versa.  
“Translation as Challenge and Source of Happiness,” published in 1997, is another text 
that is relevant to this process of transferring the metapsychology to the collective sphere, 
because it is here that for the very first time Ricœur brings “Mourning and Melancholia” and 
“Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through” together in order to understand what should be 
expected of translation. Ricœur shows that in these articles Freud developed two different 
concepts of work: one of them is related to parturition and the other to resignation and 
acceptance. Linking together both meanings leads Ricœur to argue that the task of translation is 
consistent and perfectible, although it is necessary to assume the impossibility of achieving 
absolute equivalence with the original.32  
In Memory, History, Forgetting the articulation of these two papers is really important 
because it links the anthropology of the capable human being with psychological pathologies.33 In 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” melancholy is described as a psychic condition in which self-
regard is reduced due to the loss of a loved object. Mourning, on the other side, allows us to untie 
ourselves from the lost object and leads to a return of self-regard. Thus, Freudian analysis 
underlines the tension between libido, which ties us to the beloved object, and the reality 
principle, which forces us to deal with the disappearance of this object. This analysis also adopts 
the economy of instincts to explain how much energy is required for the libido to obey reality. 
Although Ricœur recalls significant examples of collective mourning, the economic 
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characterization of the conception of work given in this paper prevents its transposition to the 
sphere of collective memory.34  We think that it is not by accident that Ricœur acknowledges that 
“Mourning and Melancholia” offers greater resistance than “Remembering, Repeating, and 
Working-Through to any transposition to the plane of collective memory…”35 On the other hand, 
Ricœur highlights “Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through” because of its procedural 
component, which allows him to defend the thesis that psychoanalytic experience, far from being 
merely passive, has an active component that is present in all instances. Thus, “[…] the 
difficulties in question are not only undergone, but … we are responsible for them, as witnessed 
by the therapeutic advice that accompanies the working-through.”36 So characterized, 
“Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through” cannot only be included in a phenomenology of 
the capable human being but, due to the absence of any instinctual characterization, can also be 
transposed to the collective processes. In short, while “Mourning and Melancholia” provides the 
categories needed to understand psychological pathologies, it still employs an instinctual 
language that prevents its application to the collective. However, “Remembering, Repeating, 
Working-Through” refers to human capacities, and in so doing, allows itself to be “reduced” to a 
phenomenology of the capable human being. Since the article has no instinctual language, its 
conclusions are transferable to the collective level. Hence, each of these articles needs to be 
articulated with the other. As in the case of “Translation as Challenge and Source of Happiness,” 
both articles are linked by the concept of work, and whereas the work of mourning is joined to 
the work of remembering, melancholy is associated with the compulsion to repeat. This 
articulation is described as follows: “What makes mourning a normal, albeit painful, 
phenomenon is that ‘when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited again’. It is from this angle that the work of mourning can be compared to the work 
of remembering. If the work of melancholia occupies a strategic position in the present essay, 
parallel to that occupied by the compulsion to repeat in the previous one, this suggests that it is 
as a work of remembering that the work of mourning proves to be liberating, although at a 
certain cost, and that this relation is reciprocal.”37 
We think that this description cannot explain by itself how the articulation of the work of 
mourning and the work of remembering is possible, because this articulation is not immediate but requires 
a third moment that catalyzes both kinds of work, something that does not exist in Freudian 
metapsychology: happy memory. Happy memory can be defined as the utopian horizon that is 
established when the work of mourning is completed and the function of memory is properly 
fulfilled. As Ricœur explains, “Yes, grief is that sadness that has not completed the work of 
mourning. Yes, joy is the reward for giving up the lost object and a token of the reconciliation 
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with its internalized object. And, inasmuch as the work of mourning is the required path for the 
work of remembering (souvenir), joy can also crown with its grace the work of remembering 
(mémoire). On the horizon of this work: a ‘happy’ memory, when the poetic image completes the 
work of mourning.”38 
Taken together, these two Freudian conceptions of work allow Ricœur to frame analytical 
solutions to mnemonic pathologies in the perspective of a phenomenology of the capable human 
being, and since it has no relation to the economy of instincts, it can be applied at the collective 
level. From this perspective, mnemonic pathologies can be described as incapability, but this 
description lacks the elements necessary for determining the reasons for these diseases and 
offering explanations as to how they might be worked through. We think that in order to explain 
both the work of memory and the reason for mnemonic pathologies Ricœur takes a further step 
toward temporality as a more essential level of analysis: “I am adopting the guiding idea of Being 
and Time that temporality constitutes not only a major characteristic of the being that we are, but 
the characteristic that, more than any other, signals the relation of this being to being qua being. I 
have all the more reason to embrace this idea as I hold, moreover, the acceptation of being as act 
and as power as the one most in keeping with a philosophical anthropology of the capable 
human being.”39  
The temporal analysis of Memory, History, Forgetting is radically different from that of 
Time and Narrative. The latter work described two conflicting traditions of temporal 
interpretation: a phenomenological and a cosmological one. In Ricœur’s opinion, although each 
of these traditions tried to overshadow its counterpart, neither of them was reducible to the other. 
As an example of this tension, Ricœur contrasted the Aristotelian conception of world time with 
the Augustinian time of the soul, Husserl’s thematization of time with the Kantian interpretation. 
Ricœur expressed his close affinity with Heidegger’s analytics, since it could integrate temporal 
moments prior to their separation.40 Still, he expressed his dissatisfaction with a variety of 
problems arising from the strategy of gaining access to temporality by overlapping an ontic 
structure with the ontological level. The ontical component was Heidegger’s personal conception 
of death, which became a structural moment of Dasein’s being, and most specifically as its 
ownmost possibility. Since Dasein's anticipation of its own death isolates it from others and 
modifies its way of being, this conception of death maintained the aporetic relation between lived 
time and cosmic time.41 Heideggerian resoluteness dislocated any possible dialogue between 
philosophical discourse related to Dasein and history. Despite his identification of being-towards-
death as the source of all limits of Heidegger’s temporal analytics,42 Ricœur sought to resolve the 
tension generated by the existential analytic in Time and Narrative by means of his concept of 
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narrative time. This third kind of temporality is the product of an imaginative synthesis of Kantian 
inspiration, where phenomenological and cosmological time are articulated through some central 
concepts drawn from philosophy of history, such as calendar time, the succession of generations 
and the trace. 
In his essay “The Mark of the Past,”43 and especially afterwards in Memory, History, 
Forgetting, Ricœur proposes an alternative way of gaining access to temporality, beyond that of 
Being and Time, and this modification finally defines his general approach to time: death is 
defined as an irruption alien to human being, it is the end of life.44 This conception of death, more 
akin to Sartre and Levinas, does not isolate the individual who faces this event from others and 
from the world, but maintains an openness to the externality and factuality.45 This modification 
allows Ricœur to collapse the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic modes of being, 
and consequently, the gap between the existential analytic and the factual sciences. The so-called 
short route of Heidegger, which establishes a direct link between the potentiality of being and 
mortality, is replaced by another long one, or as expressed by Ricœur, “it is to the 
phenomenology open to futurity that I would like to contribute with the following remarks 
against the closed phenomenology of the being-toward-death.”46 One of the consequences of this 
change in the concept of time is that memory and history are intertwined, which means that 
discoveries and stories of history alter memory of the past and, correspondingly, collective 
memory affects research into the past. In Time and Narrative, the link between phenomenological 
and cosmological time was external to these temporal manifestations. 
Ricœur reinforced his concept of temporality with two Heideggerian concepts, in order to 
explain our relationship with the people who preceded us. The concept of ‘generation’ arises 
from the idea that the human condition is not primarily biological but is instituted in a symbolic 
process of affiliation. In the case of history, the social bond is instituted through the passage of 
generations. The second concept is that of ‘productive repetition’ of the past. Inspired mainly by 
Collingwood´s concept of ‘reenactment’ and Michelet’s notion of ‘resurrection’, Ricœur argues 
that productive imagination renders past projects present, thereby, linking the past with the 
future. The idea of debt, as a moral burden with regard the past, is rooted in this concept of 
productive repetition. 
This displacement from an instinctual substrate to a temporal one obliges Ricœur to re-
elaborate psychoanalytic categories. Outlining some of them Ricœur relies on Freud’s work. After 
identifying the unconscious memories with those that repression makes inaccessible, and 
associating them from a pathological perspective with the repetition compulsion, Ricœur explains 
that “this was even one of Freud's strongest convictions, that the past once experienced is 
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indestructible. This conviction is inseparable from the thesis that the unconscious is zeitlos, 
timeless, when time is understood as the time of consciousness with its before and after, its 
successions, and coincidences.”47 This means that whoever is compelled to repeat the traumatic 
event as if she were present does so because of her inability to discriminate between different 
temporal levels. Consequently, the cure must also have a temporal component. By means of 
working-through, the traumatized person becomes aware of repressed memory after articulating 
it temporally. This is how “the work of mourning definitely separates the past from the present 
and makes way for the future.”48  
At this point, Michel de Certeau’s position about the place of death in history becomes 
central. In Time and Narrative, Ricœur highlighted the importance that Certeau accorded to the 
debt as a link between present and past, but he did not agree with the emphasis Certeau had 
assigned to death against life: “By so linking debt to loss, De Certeau places more emphasis than I 
do on the ‘tradition of a death’, and underemphasizes, in my opinion, the positive aspect of the 
life that has been, in virtue of which life is also the heritage of living potentialities.”49 This 
criticism disappears in Memory, History, Forgetting, where Ricœur finally agrees with Certeau in 
relation to the necessity of incorporating death within narrative, and with his idea of associating 
the historiographical operation with funerary rites. In his opinion, “the vis-a-vis of the historian is 
not only the dead for whom she constructs a scriptural tomb; the historian does not only strive to 
resuscitate the living of the past who are no longer but who once were, but also attempts to re-
present actions and passions.”50 The funeral rite is crucial in the work of mourning, for, when 
dead people are buried, it makes place for the living: “Greater still, repetition allows us to 
complete and to enrich the meditation proposed above under the heading of death in history. 
This led us to the act of sepulcher by which the historian, providing a place for the dead, makes a 
place for the living. A meditation on repetition authorizes a further step, following the idea that 
the dead of the past once were living and that history, in a certain manner, moves closer to their 
having-been-alive.”51 The historian plays a central role in this work of remembering and grief, 
helping to think the collective in its link to the past.52 In this process, the historical plot gives the 
traumatic event a temporal framework. The different ways in which the plot relates the space of 
experience to the horizon of expectation, intensifying or relaxing the debt to the past, signals a 
function of the productive imagination that was not originally contemplated in Time and 
Narrative.53 In this sense, the following statement is quite enlightening: “If, in fact, the facts are 
ineffaceable, if one can no longer undo what has been done, nor make it so that what has 
happened did not occur, on the other hand, the sense of what has happened is not fixed once and 
for all. In addition to the fact that events of the past can be recounted and interpreted otherwise, 
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the moral weight tied to the relation of debt with respect to the past can be increased or 
lightened.”54  
Conclusion: 
In recent decades, philosophy of history has faced the problem of justifying the 
mnemonic turn that occurred during the 1990s. One of the most complex issues was to provide a 
framework of intelligibility for the transposition of psychoanalytic categories to large groups of 
people affected by violent processes. Although originally associated with survivors of the Nazi 
death camps, its application was extended to various fields of recent history. One of the 
objectives of Memory, History, Forgetting was to provide a collective framework, but instinctual 
drive became the major obstacle for its elaboration. Beginning with his first works, Ricœur was 
interested in both psychoanalysis and history. However, until 2000 Ricœur worked on both issues 
almost completely in parallel. As an example of this, in Time and Narrative, there are only ten 
references to Freud, and almost all of them are related to the treatment of personal identity. Over 
the years, Ricœur’s thought on these issues underwent several changes, bringing these two 
domains closer together and producing a viable articulation between them. We have shown that 
the dialogue with Freud after Oneself as Another had an important influence in this articulation, 
framing psychoanalysis and history under the metacategory of otherness as flesh. Regarding the 
transposition of psychoanalytic categories from the individual to the collective sphere, we have 
argued that the economy of instincts prevented the kind of direct accomplishment of this 
transposition that Ricœur had envisaged. In fact, we held that in order to achieve such a 
transposition, Ricœur had to carry out a transcendental turn in his approach to this theme. This 
turn led him toward a double process of reduction: first, from psychoanalytical categories to a 
phenomenology of the capable human being, and from there to a temporal ontology. 
At the beginning of this article we referred to the twofold expressivity of representation 
as a means of understanding the articulation between desire and knowledge. When Ricœur 
developed the concept of representation in Time and Narrative and in “The Mark of the Past,” he 
focused on the epistemological side of this twofold expressivity since the economy of instincts 
prevented the development of the other side.55 If in Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricœur could 
articulate both sides of this expressivity, this was because he was able to reduce psychoanalytical 
categories to a temporal ontology. 
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